The paper shows logically that the central government`s equalization grant to local governments in Korea, named ordinary shared tax, has unintended effects on horizontal fiscal equity. The legal adjustment ratio of local shared tax, defined by the ratio of grants to legal fiscal gap where the gap means the difference between `basic fiscal needs` and `basic fiscal revenue`, is designed to be proportional to the fiscal gap. However, the effective adjustment ratio to actual fiscal gap will be progressive if the proportion of legal `basic fiscal revenue` to actual one exceeds the proportion of `basic fiscal needs` to actual needs. If the reverse is true, the ratio will be regressive. As the legal formula of the ordinary shared tax is repeatedly applied to the allocations of other grants such as shared tax for decentralization, real estate related shared tax, and special grant for balanced national development, the progressivity or regressivity of the grants would be reinforced. Even though it is difficult to calculate the actual fiscal needs, the grants to Kuns, rural communities, seem to be excessively progressive under reasonable assumptions.