傳統儒家的性善論是講“人性之善”, 而宋代新儒家在接續性善論傳統時則已發展爲“凡物莫不有是性”的泛性善論。這種變化主要是因爲受到佛敎的“眞如”卽佛性的本體論思維方式影響。張載和二程都有泛性善論以及本源之性與氣質之性的思想。朱熹在《太極圖說解》中已經確立了人與物“理同氣異”的思想, 但是, 在《四書集注》中却出現了“理同氣異”和“氣同理異”兩說的不同。本文分析朱熹之所以持此兩說的復雜性, 最終認爲這是因爲從性善論發展到泛性善論的不同, 給朱熹注釋和詮釋《孟子》的“生之謂性”章造成了困難。《四書集注》的使命不是突破經典“本文”的原意而提出原創性的思想, 而是要使道學的思想盡量貼近經典“本文”的原意。明乎此, 就可把朱熹著述中凡關于“氣同理異”以及“氣異而理異”的諸說都不算作朱熹本人的哲學思想, 而只是朱熹牽就《孟子》本文的“經說”。

The classical Confucian doctrine of good human nature was just as far as human beings concerned. But the Neo-Confucians starting from the Sung dynasty had developed a doctrine of good nature of the myriad things. This change has been influenced by Buddhist way of thinking. Both Zhang Zai and two Cheng brothers had this doctrine of good nature of the myriad things. Zhu Xi followed this doctrine and suggested the view that different things participate the same principle while have various material forces in his commentary on the Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity (Taijiyu shuo) by Zhou Dunyi. But we can also find the two contradictory views, one of which said that different things have same material forces but various principles, in Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu Jizhu). This article argues the seemingly contradiction of the two views is exactly the outcome of the development from the doctrine of good nature of human beings till the doctrine of good nature of the myriad things. It was the later that made Zhu Xi face a difficulty when he interpreted the relevant chapter in Mencius. According to this article, for Zhu Xi, the task of his Collected Commentaries on the Four Books was not reading into some creative thoughts of his own, but let the doctrines of Neo-Confucians adapt as far as possible to the original thought of the Confucian texts. Accordingly, the view that different things have same material forces but various principles, cannot be taken as the thought of Zhu Xi himself, but only the result of interpreting Mencius based on the doctrine of good nature of the myriad things. [Article in Chinese]