孟子的性善論作爲新儒家傳統的核心敎理，朱子的哲學體系也是爲了支持這一命題而創立的。這一主張絶非誇言。然而性善論的命題中包含著人的本性的自然發生性(或本有道德性)與主體的道德意志之間的兩立不可能性的哲學問題也是事實。本論文的目的在於，通過分析朱子對十六字敎—“人心惟危，道心惟微，惟精惟一，允執厥中”―的解釋，考察內在於朱子哲學體系中的哲學性問題。由此，一方面强化對於作爲道德性的根源的人的本性的信賴，另一方面指出，强調源於道德主體的本有道德性的理解內在著一定的局限性的朱子哲學體系的雙重性格。最後指出，朱子試圖通過它尋找對本有道德性的信賴與意志主體的道德義務之間的均衡點。朱子通過這種均衡，一方面防止了對本有道德性的信賴轉向極端主觀主義或者反律法主義，另一方面防禦了諸如格物之類的儒家經傳中道德實踐原則的妥當性。

It is of no exaggeration to say that the Mencian thesis that human nature is good consists of the core tenet of the entire Neo-Confucian tradition and that Zhu Xi’s grand philosophical system is also designed mainly to undergird this thesis. However, this thesis involves a philosophical problem, which arises from the possible incompatibility between the spontaneity of human nature or innate morality and the moral will of an agent. The main objective of this article is to address this question inherent in Zhu Xi’s philosophy, particularly through analyzing his interpretation of the sixteen character teaching―“Rexin 人心 is precarious; daoxin 道心 is subtle. Being discerning (jing 精) and being undivided (yi 一). Holding on to the mean (zhong 中)”―, which he extolled as the genuine essence of the teaching of the sages. This article reveals a dualistic feature underlying Zhu Xi’s philosophical system, which, on the one hand, fosters the belief in human nature as the self-perfect source of morality and on the other, underlines a significant limitation in comprehending this innate morality by a moral agent. Ultimately, this article shows that he thus intended to seek a proper balance between the belief in innate morality and the moral responsibility of a voluntary agent in order both to avoid an excessive belief in innate morality, which is liable to radical subjectivism or antinomianism, and to defend the validity of practical principles prescribed in the Confucian classics, such as ‘investigation of things (格物).’ [Article in Chinese]